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In the .Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GLORIA G. FENTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 10238

CEDAR LUMBER & HA.RDWARE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF CASE

The plaintiff-respondent agrees with the statement
of the nature of the case in the brief of the defendantappellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The plaintiff-respondent agrees with the statement
of disposition in the lower court as presented by the defendant-appellant.
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2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The plaintiff-respondent seeks an affirmance of the
action of the lower court quieting title to the disputed
property in the plaintiff.
srrATEMENT OF FACTS

There are several differences from the standpoint
of the parties in the statement of facts. The last sentence of defendant-appellant's statement of facts, "The
west two rods of the street property is not in dis
pute and is O\vned by the appellant and we are only
concerned with the east two rods or the half of the street
adjoining the property of the plaintiff" is not entirely
correct. The plaintiff-respondent has no claim on the
west two rods of said street property. However, one Jim
Urie, living at 425 Circleway Drive, is the adjoining property owner to approximately the South 25 feet of the
west part of the property that was the street property,
and the remainder of said \vest side of said street property is owned by one Ann J. Gardner. The undersigned i8.
informed that said Jim Urie does intend to assert a claim
to the portion of said west two rods that is adjacent to
his property, and is uninformed as to the intention of
said Ann ·J. Gardner. The only statement that the plaintiff .. respondent ·~rould be willing to be bound by in relation to the 'Nest two rods is that the plaintiff-respondent
clailns no interest in said west two rods of said property.
In addition, other item.s that should be included in
the statement of facts are to be found in the Stipulation
of the parties which '\vas filed on 3 July, 1964:
"3. rrhat on the 15th of March, 1950, one Kate Wallace made and executed a warranty deed to Cedar
City a municipal corporation, whereby the land in
'
question,
together with t\vo rods on the West thereoJ.~
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was delivered to Cedar City Corporation. That said
deed contained the following statement, in addition
to the description: 'The above property is to be used
for street and no other purpose.' That at some date
after the 15th of March and prior to the 4th of May
of 1950, at a date unknown to any of the parties,
this deed was delivered by Kate Wallace to Cedar City and was recorded at the request of Cedar City.
That at the time of said transaction, a street by the
name of Dewey Avenue had been opened up North
fron1 the captioned street, running between 200 South
and 400 South in Cedar City, Utah. That it was the intention of Cedar City Corporation to extend said Dewey Avenue to the South, and Cedar City Corporation
accepted said deed for this purpose. However, shortly after accepting said property, the defendant \Vhich
had purchased from the said Kate Wallace's grantee
all of the property now known as Valley Circle Subdivision and sho'\vn on Page 3 of the abstract, opened
negotiations with Cedar City Corporation to subdivide the land South of the land in question, which
culminated in January, 1952, in a subdivision shown
on Page 3 of said abstract as 'Valley Circle Subdivision,' and that this subdivision plan did not require
the extension of De\vey Avenue on to the South, and
had no road connecting with the land in question.
That as a result of this subdivision, the use of the
area in question for a street was no longer needed,
and said area was never placed on the official map
of said city as a street because of this, and any city
equipment on said area was there only to control
weeds and unsightliness, and was never there for
the purpose of opening up a street or grading same.
That said street has never at any time appeared on
any official map as a city street and it has never at
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4
any time been opened up and used as a street."
That in addition certain other paragraphs out of
said stipulation should be included in the fact situation,
as follows:
"5. That thereafter, Cedar C-ity Corporation by ordiw
nance, vacated said land including the land in question and the two r~1ds immediately West thereof, as a
street. Same vvas done with the consent of the property o\vner on the East, and also \vith the consent of
the property owner on the West, with the exception
of the South approximately 25 feet; that said ordi·
nance \vas not contested in any way. That Entry No.
42 of said abstract is a copy of said ordinance."
"6. That on the 17th day of July, 1961, the plaintiff
above na1ned acquired the land in question, together
with four rods East thereof by quitclaim deed, That
the grantors in said deed had owned the four rods
adjoining on the east at the time of said vacation by
Cedar City Corporation. That said quitclaim deed to
the plaintiff dated 17 July, 1961 and recorded 20 July
1961 did contain the property in question, being the
East t\V·o rods of the area vacated as a street by said
Cedar City ,Corporation. That the deed to the plaintiff is in said abstract as En~ry No. 43. That the property abutting on the street on the west is owned
by a party not a party to this action."
"8. 'rhat the only claim of the defendant to the land
in question is the quitclaim deed irom Kate Wallace
shown as Entry
.. No. :39 in said abstract. That said
defendant makes no other claim to said property,
other than this deed, and said defendant acknowledges that it has no other clair.n to said property except said deed."
"9. 'rhat each of the parties have paid the taxes on
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5
said property for the entire period since said street
was vacated by Cedar City Corporation."

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEF.,ENDANT-APPELLANT'S POINT 1 IS PREDICATED UPON AN E·RRONEOUS ASSUMPTION
THAT THE PLAIN'fiFF-RESPONDENT DOES NOT
CLAIM THE FEE IN THE 'rWO ROD.S IN QUESTION.

The fact stipulation which has been quoted by the
plaintiff-respondent states the plaintiff's position in the
l~~t oortion of Paragraph 7:
"That the claim of the plaintiff to the land in question is based upon her being a successor in interest
to the TJarties who owned the property irnmediately
to the East of said street at the time of said vacation of said street by Cedar City, and succeeding to
their right in the East two rods of said street by vir~
tue of said deed from the grantors, who were adja-"
cent property owners on the East of said street at the
time of vacation of said street by Cedar City Corporation."
At no time has plaintiff taken the position that she
is not the owner in fee in the East two rods, but claims
all th~ rights that her predecessors in interest had at the
time the deed was executed to her.
This n1atter as to what the predecessor in interest
of the plaintiff acquired upon vacation of the street by
Cedar City by ordinance is governed under the provisions
of Title 36-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and Title 271-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which was in effect at
the time of the vacation by Cedar City, which reads as
follows:
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"27-l-7. Public Acquired Only Easement - Fee in
Abutting Owner. By taking or accepting land for a
highway the public acquires only the right-of-\vav
and incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining
it. A transfer of land bounded by a high\vay passes
the title of the person whose estate is transferred to
the 1niddle of the highway."
The 1943 Code which was in effect at the time of
part of the actions of the parties reads the same. The
various cases that are applicable to this item hold to the
effect that this statute creates a presumption that whenever title to land adjoining a street is passed, this passes
title to the center of the street and that this is a complete presumtion and that the only way to overcome it
is by evidence of the intent of the grantors otherwise.
'fhis doctrine was enacted by the Utah State Supreme
Court in interpreting this particular section in the case
of Brown vs. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 36
Utah 257, 102 Pac. 740, 1n which the Supren1e Court of
Utah pointed out that the statute was declaratory of
Common La\v, and that at Common l,aw a private conveyance of land bounded by or abutting on a highway,
the fee to which belongs to the abutting owners, is
presumed to convey in the highway to the center
line thereof. This doctrine is affirmed in the case of
Hummel vs. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 Pac. 2d 410, in
which in addition to restating the doctrine of Brown vs.
Oregon Short Line Railroad, it was pointed out that the
presumption is rebutted only by clear evidence that the
grantor did not intend to convey his interest lying in the
highway. Under these conditions it should be presumed
that the abandon1nent by Cedar City Corporation vested
in the then owners of the abutting property title to the
land in question to the center of the street, unless there
is a clear and preponderant showing of intent by the pre-
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vious grantor otherwise. This is in accord with established doctrine in Common Law as set forth in Section
1.28, of Highways, \~olume 25, American Jurisprudence,
at Page 424:
"Where the public agency acquires the title to the
fee in trust for public use, as distinguished, on the
one hand, from an absolute and unqualified fee simple estate, and on the other from a mere easement
of passage, the title, upon vacation or abandonment,
likewise reverts to the then abutting o\vner, ... "
The big question in the case at hand is whether or
not one Kate Wallace intended to retain any reversionary
interest in the land in question. Inasmuch as Kate Wallace has passed to her reward, one must look to her prior
actions to detern1ine her intent. This has been declared
on the land in question a.nd the adjoining two rods west
thereof -- that it was her intent to convey said property
for a street. Prior to conveying said property for a street,
she had completely divested herself of the property on
the West. As to the adjoining property on the East, Kate
Wallace, on Page 27 of the abstract on 23 October, 1942,
deeded the adjoining property to Alice S. Smith, with
reference that it \Vent to the East line of the public road
as Platted on Plat A of the plat of said property and adjoining property made by Theron Ashcroft. There is no
question that she did intend to convey to a street, and
in this deed there is no reservation of any right whatsoever in the fee in the street. It is most significant that
this was her intent because the second paragraph, "This
deed is made subject to the express condition that no
building shall be placed upon the above described property less than 25 feet from the West boundary line thereof, and that no dwelling house of a value less than
$2,000.00 shall be erected upon said property~' requires
a setback from the West because it is a street, and she
intended to treat it as a street.
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Of equal significance is the deed from Kate Wallace
to Afton Duffin dated 13 April 1943 which is Entry No.
28 of the abstract, wherein the description in the conveyance refers to the east line of the public road as the
West line of the property, and again states, "to the east
line of the public road as platted on Plat A of the plat
of said property and adjoining property, made by Theron
Ashcroft." This w·ould indicate that lVIr. Ashcroft had
made a plat of the property that did have this area as a
street. Also ·it is significant that in this deed the same
condition concerning no dwelling house to be placed
nearer than 25 feet of the west line of the property and
Kate Wallace treating it as a street. Again in this deed to
Afton Duffin, there was no reservation of any fee in the
road whatsoever.
Again it is significant in Entry No. 29 of the abstract
that Afton Duffin in deeding to Alice S. Smith, the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, again referred to the east
line of the public road as platted on Plat A of the plat of
said property and adjoining property made by Theron
Ashcroft, indicating that there was a plat that showed
this as a street, and again had the reservation of 25 feet
of the \vest line of said property.
Of even greater significance is that on September
17, 1946, this lady ~ate Wallace, apparently to remedy
an error in previous deeds, again deeded to one Alice S.
Smith, and specifically referred to the previous deeds as
being in error. Again, Kate Waliace did not in any way
claim or establish any reservation of the fee in the area
of the street. If there \\:·as a street, these deeds certainly
passed the fee in the adjoining property under the provisions of Title 36-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which
existed at that time.
The next ite1n of interest is Entry No. 36 in the ab·
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stract which is the warranty deed from Kate vVallace to
Cedar City, which was a deed for the street property and
contained the provision, ''The above property is to be
used for street and no other purpose.'' Again one must
note that this is a warranty deed and not an easement,
and under these conditions there is no question that Kate
Wallace felt that she had already passed on the fee to
the adjoining property o\vners. Except for statute, if Kate
Wallace had a fee, this would have passed it on to Ceda1
City Corporation. Certainly there is no indication in this
deed of any intent of one Kate Wallace to keep a ,fee in
herself~ nor do the words that said property is to be .used
for a street and no other purpose constitute a reversion
to kate Wallace. By statute said document passed on
only to Cedar City the right of use for a street, regardless of the language of this deed. It is to be noted that
the date of this deed to Cedar City Corporation was 1~
March 1950 and same was recorded 4 May 1950.
The next item of significance in the abstract is Entry
No. 38. It is to be noted that this vvas after the deed to
Cedar City of the street and that Cedar City had accepted
and recorded the deed to the street prior thereto, and
that the fact stipulation entered into by the parties was
that Cedar City did accept this deed and did record same.
Pertaining to Entry No. 38 of the abstract, it is a quit
claim deed from Kate Wallace and her husband to Alice
S. Smith of the· san1e property on the East, and again
rAferred to the street . as platted by Theron Ashcroft,
running West 132.9 feet and then running along the captioned property ·at the side of the street. Again it requires
the property not to have a house within 25 feet from the
west boundary thereof, and again says it is given to correct that certain "\Varranty deed made previously.
The most significant transaction of the entire matter is shown in Entry No. 39, which is the deed from
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Kate Wallace to Cedar Lumber and Hardware Company
vvhich is the basis of the defendant's claim on the property which follows the description of the street property,
and is notarized by counsel for the defendant. The re ..
cording of this deed shows no document stamps, and
under these conditions it is presumed that nothing was
paid for this deed. This is a quit claim deed which contains the notation, "It is the intention of the grantor to
convey all right, title and interest which grantor may
own in the above property, heretofore conveyed to Cedar
City Corporation for a street, in the event Cedar City
Corporation vacates said street." What does this arnount
to? It amounts to recognition that there was a street.
This was accepted by Cedar Luntber and Hard,vare Company on the supposition that there was a street present.
This is one of the n1ost revealing documents in the entire line of this particular transaction. Bearing in mind
that it was prepared by the defendant's attorney, was
this the original deed that was prepared? It is quite apparent that it was not. Certainly the defendant's attorney did not voluntarily put in the words Hmay own''· in
referring to any interest that Kate Wallace might have
had, but simply shows that it \\ras the intention of the
defendant at that tirne to acquire this- property from
Kate Wallace without cost, have the City abandon same,
and include it in the subdivision \Vhich ran to the West
and the South of the property, and upon being approached to sign the deed referring to any reversion interest,
said Kate Wallace had made the statement that she did
not have any reversion interest, and had refused to sign
any deed with any sort of a qualification clause on it.
That thereafter, after considerable discussion, the deed
had been redrafted and that all that Kate Wallace intended to transfer \vas any interest she may olvn. Cer..
tainly this is not the action of a party who has intend·
ed to retain in herself any fee interest or any other item.
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Kate Wallace at that time was of the opinion that she
had completely divested herself of the property, and that
in her deed previously the fee interest had gone to her
successors in interest on the various sides of the property; that she could not be talked into signing a deed purporting to convey any fee interest or reversionary interest, and that she had refused to sign this deed until the
insertion of the words "may own'~ were included. Certainly she signed the deed without consideration, a~'.d
·with the stipulation that she did not claim anything in
the property and that all she was signing was a quit
claim deed.
POINT IT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THA1., VACA'rING A STREET PASSES TITLE TO THE FEE IN
THE S'I'REET.
The findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ as
prepared by defendant's counsel amount to a finding that
at the time of the vacation of the street by Cedar City
Corporation, the East side thereof was owned by plaint·
iff's predecessors in interest, and that as such they
owned the fee to the center of the street in conformity
with the statute, Title 27-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 195:-'
and 36-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and that trans
fer of the land bounded on the East of the street passed
the title of the person \vhose estate was transfer1·ed to
the tniddle of the street, and that at this time title was
passed at the time of the conveyance to plaintifrs various predecessors in interest from Kate Wallace and her
predecessors in interest, and that each of these conveyances passed title to the middle of the street, and that
even if there were a question as to whether or not there
was a street before the deed to Cedar City Corporation,
the correction deed thereafter from Kate Wallace to a
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predecessor in interest of the plaintiff referring to the
street, referred to the actual street and took any question out of the matter, and if there was any fee interest
still in Kate Wallace it was passed by the correction deed
at that time. This is also exemplified and shown by the
fact that at the time of the deed to the defendant, said
Kate Wallace claimed nothing, and used the word "May"
to sho\v that she \vas making no claim at all to any interest in the property \vhatsoever, and felt that she had
conveyed away any interest she m.ight have in the area,
and was simply being talked into signing a deed. Under
these conditions, the court's .finding that plaintiff's ·predecessors in interest were the owners of the adjoining
property at the tirne of the vacation of the street by Cedar
City Corporation, amounts to a finding that they were
the owners in fee of the East portion 9f the street, . and
that as such, the East two rods of the street came to
them as owners of the fee and the fee in the adjoining
property.
There is no question that counsel for the defend.ant
does not claim there \'vas any reversion to the grantor
established by the deed to Cedar City Corporation. If so,
why the following question on flage 11 of defendant-apu
pellant's brief, "\Vhat if Kate Wallace had instead put
in her deed 'only an easement for a public street over
the above property is hereby conveyed and if Cedar City
never opens up a street, or if opened and later vacated,
the property shall revert to the grantor'?" Certainly this
question would not be necessary if there had been any
reversion.
In the· case of Brown vs. Oregon Short Line, 102 Pac.
740, 36 Utah 257, as a leading case on the subject, it is
clearly shown that the court is justified in its finding
that plaintiff is entitled to the property. In that case it
was held "that a grantor in granting an easement may
restrict his conveyance by apt words to the precise par·
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eel of land intended to be conveyed, and he may reserve
to himself the title to that portion of land within the
street subject to the public easement, and if it appears
that such was the intention of the party, the intention
will prevail, and the land in the street, in case it is vacated, will revert to the grantor and not to the abutting
owner." Counsel now wants to argue that the words "to
use property for a street" amounted to reversion. This
is indeed no so, and Kate Wallace did not think it was so.
As a matter of statute, all that was conveyed by the
deed was the right of use, and as a matter of statute, if there were any conveyances of any adjoining property, they also conveyed to the center of the street unless the deeds specifically said otherwise. There is no
place that any of the deeds have said otherwise, and
certainly the corrective deed in November of 1950, after
the property had been deeded to the city, passed on, where
there was no reservation, any interest in the fee that
was still existent. ~L\.lso it is clear that in the various
references to the street on the West of the property, at
the time of making the original deeds and the other correcting deeds, said Kate Wallace was of the opinion that
the property she was conveying was bounded on the
west by a street, and that she intended to divest herself
of the fee to the East ha1f of the street in these i terns
also. In no place is there any reservation. If there was
any question in anyone's mind as to her intent, the very
fact that she refused to claim a fee interest in the street
but simply said that she "may own" in the deed to the
defendant, completely does away with any question of
that nature.

POINT III
THE RULE THAT A CONVEYANCE OF LAND ABUTTING UPON A STREET ALSO CONVEYS TO THE
CENTER 0~.., THE STREET HAS NO APPLI'CA TION
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WHERE THERE IS NO STREET EITHER OPEN AND
IN USE OR EXISTING BY MAP OR PLAT 1S FAL-

LACIOUS.
This assun1es that before any city or public body has
any interest or rights in any street that they must open
and use same as such, or put it on a map or plat. This
is not true The rules of law is that there are ways in
which it can be found that a city or public body has accepted a particular street.
There are also other ways in which it can be tound
that a public body has accepted a particular street. If a
city has not accepted a street and private individuals
open it up, there still is not a public easerr1ent although there may be a private easement established, and if there is a private easement, abandonment
of a public easement over the same property by a city
does not do a\vay with a private easement When
property is tendered by an individual to a city for
a street, either in a subdivision or by any other tneans,
the controlling factor on w·hether or not it is a street
that can be vacated by ordinance or some other appropriate means of city govern1nent, is whether or not it is
accepted by the city. In the Stipulation that is part of
the record, in Paragraph 3, one finds the following:
"That at some date after the 15th of March and
prior to the 4th of :viay of 1950, at a date unknown
to any of the parties, this deed was delivered by
Kate Wallace to Cedar City and \vas recorded at
the request of Cedar City. 'fhat at the time of said
transaction, a street by the name of Dewey Avenue
had been opened up North from the captioned street,
running bet,veen 200 South and 400 South in Cedar
City, Utah. That it \vas the intention of Cedar City
Corporation to extend said Dewey Avenue to the
South, and Cedar City Corporation accepted said
deed for this purpose."
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This amounts to an agreement by the parties that
the deed and the property was accepted by Cedar City
Corporation for a street. Under these conditions, where
there is an agreen1ent that it was accepted for a street,
the question of whether it was opened up or not, or put
on a map or plat, has no bearing on the matter, as they
were simply ways of showing acceptance.
POINT IV
THE INTENT OF KATE \\"PALLACE WAS TO CONVEY THE FEE OF Th~ EAST HALF OF SAID
STREET TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNER
ON THE EAST.
This is shown by the fact that in every deed signed
by Kate Wallace she referred to the street and required
until the time of 1950 that the house be set back from
the street on the West; that in 1950, after having deeded this specific property to Cedar City for a street, she
again deeded the property to the predecessors in interest
of the plaintiff, on the East, and again failed in any way
to make any reservation. There is no reservation at any
point by Kate Wallace, and the cases and statute so hold
that there is a presumption that the person does transfer to the middle of the street. There is no question this
was the intent of Kate Wallace and she herself indicated that it was her intent by the language of the deed
that she signed which the defendant-appellant claims
is the basis of its rights. The use of the word "n1ay" indicates that she does not at any time claiin anything
still in the property. On Page 20 of the defendant-appellant's brief, in referring to the deed to the defendant,
the word "may" has been left out. Is this an attempt
to put something in the deed that is not correct, or to
make the deed read different from what it actually did?
Commenting upon the defendant-appellant's statement on Page 22 and 23 of brief to the effect that some-
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one is attempting to get something for nothing, one has
only to look at the deed whereby defendant claims to
have acquired title from Kate Wallace, to find that the
consideration was $1.00; that the notary was counsel
for the defendant, and that there was no document
stamp placed upon the deed, to ascertain who was
trying to get something for nothing. An examination
of the deed to the plaintiff from plaintiff's predecessors in interest, reveals that for the property in question and the four rods immediately adjacent thereto
on the East, $2.20 in document stamps was placed on
said deed by the persons selling the property. There is
absolutely no question that Mrs. Wallace had no desire
to retain anything to herself. The language in the deed
to the City does not amount to a reversion. The statutes very clearly indicate that anyone passing land
bounded by a street passes title of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the highway unless
there is a specific exemption. In four deeds which Mrs.
Wallace signed affecting the East boundary of the property, there was no exception whatsoever, and in each of
these deeds she referred to a street. One of them was
after she had deeded the property in question to Cedar
City and Cedar City had accepted and recorded this
deed. Certainly the language of J\1rs. Wallace in the deed
to the defendant does not claim any right whatsoever in
the property.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, plaintiff-respondent claims that she
did acquire the fee to the East two rods of said street
from her predecessors in interest, when the predecessors
in interest deeded to her the East two rods of said street
and the adjoining four rods on the East, and that her
predecessors in interest had acquired all rights to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
East two rods of said street at time of deeding by Mrs.
Wallace and at the time of the abandonment by Cedar
City Corporation. It is rather unique to notice that defendant-appellant contends that there never was a street,
inasmuch as he has by stipulation, agreed that Cedar
City accepted the street, and accepted the property for
a street. Also if there never was a street, how could it
be abandoned by Cedar City? Inasmuch as the plaintiffrespondent is the owner of the fee in the two rods in
question by deed, and is in addition owner to the surface rights by deed since the abandonment by Cedar
City Corporation, the only conclusion there can be is
that the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to have the title
to the two rods in question quieted in herself, and that
the decree of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Patrick H. Fenton,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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